Indonesia’s participation in the agreement holds particular strategic significance for India. In July 2026, India signed defence agreements worth approximately $630 million with Indonesia, including the supply of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and indigenous Astra air-to-air missiles. Through the BrahMos deal, India has been expanding its defence exports across Southeast Asia.
The new defence cooperation between Indonesia, Pakistan and Türkiye raises questions about its potential impact on India’s strategic interests. Türkiye has a strong defence industry, while its military ties with Pakistan are already well established. Against this backdrop, the possibility of joint defence production and technical cooperation could have implications for regional defence dynamics. However, no provision specifically targeting India through military action or seeking to halt India-Indonesia missile deals has emerged from the Badr agreement.
India’s challenge will be to strengthen its defence relationship with Indonesia while continuing to expand its defence partnerships and export opportunities across Southeast Asia. For now, the Badr pact is an agreement focused on cooperation between defence industries, rather than a military alliance obligating its members to defend one another in the event of an armed attack. Its actual impact will depend on the extent to which the four countries translate the agreement into joint projects and technical cooperation.
The Badr agreement follows the Mecca Pact, a joint defence agreement involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye. It is the second such agreement following that arrangement, bringing together four Islamic countries.
In a statement, Türkiye’s Defence Ministry said, “By leveraging each country's unique military production capabilities, this initiative will promote cooperation and integration, strengthen defence industrial capabilities, and help meet the needs of friendly and allied nations.”
The agreement has also raised questions about whether Pakistan could gain access to technology associated with India’s BrahMos and Astra missile systems through Indonesia.
Speaking to The Times of India (TOI), Sudhir Kumar Mishra, DRDO Chair Emeritus and former Director General, CEO and MD of BrahMos Aerospace, said the defence agreements with Indonesia had been concluded with adequate safeguards.
“Only the ‘User Manual’ will be shared with Jakarta, not the ‘Technology Transfer Manual’,” Mishra said.
He further stated, “These agreements include strict conditions relating to data security, intellectual property and defence sovereignty, which Indonesia will have to comply with. Therefore, there is no question of technologies such as BrahMos and Astra falling into the hands of our adversaries.”
Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat (Retired), a senior fellow at the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies, also dismissed speculation that India’s defence agreements with Jakarta could be undermined by the new arrangement.
Speaking to TOI, he said, “An MoU does not mean a military alliance. It would not be sensible to abandon a firm defence export contract for an MoU that may not produce any concrete outcome. The wording of the MoU suggests that the ‘Badr MoU’ is only an arrangement related to work-sharing. It is a working arrangement among countries with a common Islamic identity, intended to bring their defence R&D efforts together. India should keep an eye on it, but there is no need to worry.”
Ahlawat added that India would need to export its indigenous weapons to countries whose strategic outlook aligns with its own if it wanted to become a defence superpower.
“To become a defence superpower, India will have to export its indigenous weapons to countries whose thinking is similar to India's. This is why defence agreements are being signed with Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. Selling weapons does not mean sharing the technology in a way that enables the buyer country to do everything independently,” he said.
He also pointed out that Indonesia would continue to require support from India, the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), to operate and maintain the BrahMos and Astra missiles and subsequently extend their service lives.
“Indonesia will need the support of the OEM (India) to operate these missiles (BrahMos and Astra), maintain them and subsequently extend their service life. Therefore, India should continue its efforts to become a major exporter of defence equipment,” Ahlawat said.
The Badr MoU’s strategic significance for India will ultimately depend on how the four signatories implement their commitments. While the agreement opens the door to closer defence industrial and research cooperation among Pakistan, Türkiye, Qatar and Indonesia, the safeguards cited by Indian defence experts and the distinction between an MoU and a binding military alliance remain central to assessing its implications for India’s defence exports and regional partnerships.
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